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Abstract The Energy [R]evolution 2010 scenario is
an update of the Energy [R]evolution scenarios
published in 2007 and 2008. It takes up recent trends
in global energy demand and production and analyses
to which extent this affects chances for achieving
climate protection targets. The main target is to reduce
global CO2 emissions to 3.7 Gt/a in 2050, thus
limiting global average temperature increase to below
2°C and preventing dangerous anthropogenic inter-
ference with the climate system. A ten-region energy
system model is used for simulating global energy
supply strategies. A review of sector and region
specific energy efficiency measures resulted in the
specification of a global energy demand scenario
incorporating strong energy efficiency measures. The
corresponding supply scenario has been developed in
an iterative process in close cooperation with stake-
holders and regional counterparts from academia,
NGOs and the renewable energy industry. The Energy
[R]evolution scenario shows that renewable energy
can provide more than 80% of the world’s energy
needs by 2050. Developing countries can virtually
stabilise their CO2 emissions by 2025 and reduce
afterwards, whilst at the same time increasing energy
consumption due to economic growth. OECD
countries will be able to reduce their emissions by
up to 90% by 2050. However, without a comprehensive
energy efficiency implementation strategy across all
sectors, the renewable energy development alone will
not be enough to make these drastic emissions cuts.
Keywords Global demand projection . Energy
efficiency . Efficiency standard . Global energy
scenario . CO2 reduction . Renewable energy
Background to Energy [R]evolution scenarios
Nearly 2 years after publishing the first two editions
Energy [R]evolution scenario in 2007 and 2008
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(Greenpeace/EREC 2007; Krewitt et al. 2007), the
latest Energy [R]evolution 2010 scenario picks up
recent trends in global energy systems and analyses
to which extent they affect chances for achieving
the overall target: transforming our unsustainable
global energy supply system into a system which
complies with climate protection targets, and at the
same time offers solutions for secure access to
affordable energy services in all world regions. The
Energy [R]evolution scenario aims to illustrate the
feasibility of reducing global CO2 emissions to
10 Gt per year in 2050, with an advanced scenario
that goes as far as reduces to 3.7 Gt per year in
2050.
Methods
The Energy [R]evolution scenarios were jointly
commissioned by Greenpeace and the European
Renewable Energy Council from the Institute of
Technical Thermodynamics, part of the German
Aerospace Center (DLR). The supply scenarios were
calculated using the MESAP/PlaNet simulation model
adopted in the previous editions of Energy[R]evolu-
tion studies published in 2007 and 2008. Detailed
analyses carried out during preparation of the 2008
Energy [R]evolution study were also used as input for
the 2010 edition. These studies comprise in particular
the analysis of global energy demand from Ecofys
Netherlands (Graus and Blomen 2008) and the study
on global sustainable biomass potentials from the
German Biomass Research Center (Seidenberger et al.
2008), see the “Estimates of the potential of renewable
energy sources” section below. The future develop-
ment pathway for car technologies is based on a
special report produced in 2008 by the Institute of
Vehicle Concepts, DLR for Greenpeace International
(Schmid 2008).
The MESAP/PlaNet model
The simulation model PlaNet of the energy and
environmental planning package MESAP (2008) has
been created for long-term strategic planning on a
national, regional or local level. PlaNet consists of
two independent modules: a flow calculation module,
balancing the flows of commodities of an energy
demand and supply model, a cost calculation module
for the calculation of the corresponding macroeco-
nomical costs. Energy system analyses with PlaNet
are carried out in two sequential steps: first the energy
and material flows are determined; then based on the
results of the flow calculation, the costs of this energy
system are calculated.
The PlaNet flow calculation uses a set of linear
equations, which can be solved sequentially. In a
simulation model, the user specifies the activities or
drivers of demand represented as quantities of a
commodity, for example the population or the GDP.
With the help of intensities (ratios between flows) like
electricity consumption per person, the demand for
energy services or the final energy demand can be
determined. If a commodity is produced by more than
one process, market shares for these processes have to
be specified. The market shares define the output of a
process. The input into this process will be calculated
with process efficiency. This schematic allows the
integrated calculation of energy flows from primary
energy sources to demand drivers. The cost calcu-
lations are based on the results of the flow calculation.
The estimates of the future development of popula-
tion, GDP and energy intensities used in this study are
presented in detail below (“Key drivers for energy
demand” section).
A ten-region global energy system model imple-
mented in the MESAP/PlaNet environment (MESAP
2008) is used for simulating global energy supply
strategies. The ten regions correspond to the world
regions as specified by the IEA’s World Energy
Outlook 2009 (Africa, China, India, Latin America,
Middle East, OECD Europe, OECD North America,
OECD Pacific, Other Developing Asia, Transition
Economies) (IEA 2009a). Model calibration for the
base year 2007 is based on IEA energy statistics (IEA
2009b, c).
The scenarios
Three scenarios up to the year 2050 are outlined in this
research: a Reference scenario, a basic Energy [R]
evolution scenario with a target to reduce energy related
CO2 emissions by 50%, from their 1990 levels, and an
advanced Energy [R]evolution version which envis-
ages a fall of more than 80% in CO2 by 2050.
The Reference scenario is based on the reference
scenario in the International Energy Agency’s 2009
World Energy Outlook (IEA 2009a). This only takes
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existing international energy and environmental pol-
icies into account. The Reference scenario does not
consider additional policies to reduce greenhouse gas
emissions. As the IEA’s projection only covers a time
horizon up to 2030, it has been extended by
extrapolating its key macroeconomic and energy
indicators forward to 2050. Long-term projections of
economic developments are only indicative and are
used to project future development of the global
energy demand and are by no means forecasts. The
Reference scenario provides a baseline for compari-
son with both Energy [R]evolution scenarios. Com-
pared to the previous (2007) IEA projections (IEA
2007), WEO 2009 assumes a slightly lower average
annual growth rate of world Gross Domestic Product
(GDP; 3.1%, instead of 3.6% over the period 2007–
2030). At the same time, it expects global final energy
consumption in 2030 to be 6% lower than in the
WEO 2007 report. China and India are expected to
grow faster than other regions, followed by the Other
Developing Asia group of countries, Africa and the
Transition Economies (mainly the former Soviet
Union). The OECD share of global purchasing power
parity (PPP) adjusted GDP is expected decrease from
55% in 2007 to 29% by 2050.
The Energy [R]evolution scenario has a key target
of 50% renewables of the final energy consumption
by 2050. A second objective is the global phasing out
of nuclear energy. To achieve these goals, the scenario
is characterised by significant efforts to fully exploit
the large potential for energy efficiency. At the same
time, all cost-effective sustainable renewable energy1
sources are used for heat and electricity generation, as
well as the production of bio fuels. The general
framework parameters for population and GDP growth
remain unchanged from the Reference scenario.
The Advanced Energy [R]evolution scenario takes
a much more radical approach and aims to reduce
global energy related CO2 emissions by more than
80% in 2050, based on 1990 levels, to increase the
likelihood of limiting warming to less than a +2°
increase of the global average temperature. In order to
achieve this even more ambitious reduction of CO2
emissions, the advanced scenario assumes much
shorter lifetimes for coal-fired power plants—20 years
instead of 40 years. The shorter lifetime for coal
power plants enables a larger deployment of renew-
able energy sources and the annual growth rates of
renewable energy sources, especially solar photovol-
taic, wind and concentrating solar power plants, have
therefore been increased.
The advanced scenario also uses the general frame-
work parameters of population and economic growth, as
well as most of the energy efficiency roadmap from the
basic Energy [R]evolution (E[R]) scenario. In the
transport sector, however, the advanced E[R] scenario
has a final energy demand 15% to 20% lower in 2050
compared to the basic E[R] scenario. This is due to a
combination of increased use of public transport and a
faster uptake of efficient combustion vehicles and—
after 2025—a larger share of electric vehicles. Within
the heating sector, there is a faster expansion of
combined heat and power generation (CHP) in the
industry sector, more electricity for process heat and a
faster growth of solar and geothermal heating systems.
Combined with a larger share of electric drives in the
transport sector, this results in a higher overall demand
for power. Even so, the overall global electricity
demand in the advanced Energy [R]evolution scenario
is still lower than in the Reference scenario. In the
advanced scenario, the latest market development
projections of the renewable industry have been
calculated for all sectors. More electric and hydrogen
vehicles, combined with the faster implementation of
smart grids and expanding super grids (about 10 years
ahead of the basic E[R] scenario) allows a higher share
of fluctuating renewable power generation (photovol-
taic and wind). The threshold of a 40% proportion of
renewables in global primary energy supply is there-
fore passed just after 2030 (also 10 years ahead of the
basic E[R] scenario). By contrast, the quantity of
biomass used for energy purposes and large hydro
1 Definition Renewable energy: The authors define Renewable
energy (RE) as any form of energy from geophysical or
biological sources that is replenished by natural processes at a
rate that equals or exceeds its rate of use. As long as the rate of
extraction of this energy does not exceed the natural energy
flow rate, then the resource can be utilized for the indefinite
future and can be considered as “renewable”. Not all energy
classified as “renewable” is necessarily “endless”; for example,
it is possible to utilize biomass at a greater rate than it can grow.
By contrast, the rate of utilization of direct solar energy has no
bearing on the rate at which it reaches the earth. Most forms of
RE produce little or no CO2 emissions, which make them
import resources for addressing the mitigation of climate
change. A life-cycle assessment of the entire production chain
is from great importance to ensure the source is truly
sustainable. For a RE resource to be sustainable, it must be
inexhaustible and must not damage the environment, socially
acceptable and climate friendly.
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power remain approximately the same in both Energy
[R]evolution scenarios, for sustainability reasons.
Both the basic and the advanced Energy [R]
evolution scenarios have been developed in a back-
casting process.2 The CO2 emission target has been
defined on the basis of the IPCC 4th assessment
report, category 1 scenario (IPCC 2007) to restrict the
increase in global mean temperatures under +2°C
with a required CO2 reduction of −85% to −50% by
2050. Therefore, the main target is to reduce global
CO2 emissions to 10 Gt/a by 2050 in the basic Energy
[R]evolution scenario and 3.7 Gt/a in the advanced
Energy [R]evolution scenario, thus limiting global
average temperature increase well below 2°C and
preventing dangerous anthropogenic interference with
the climate system (Hansen et al. 2008, see also the
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate
Change, Article 2, UNFCCC 1992). As the authors do
not consider nuclear energy as an option that supports
the transition towards a sustainable energy supply
system, a second constraint is the phasing out of
nuclear power plants until 2050.
Energy demand projections
In order to estimate the global and regional energy
efficiency potential, the Dutch institute Ecofys devel-
oped energy demand scenarios for the Greenpeace
Energy [R]evolution analysis in 2008 (Graus and
Blomen 2008). These scenarios cover energy demand
over the period 2005 to 2050 for ten world regions.
Two low energy demand scenarios for energy
efficiency improvements have been defined. The first
is based on the best technical energy efficiency
potentials and is called “Technical”. The second
energy efficiency scenario is based on more moderate
energy savings, taking into account implementation
constraints in terms of costs and other barriers and is
called “Revolution”. The technical potential is defined
as the energy use that can be reduced by implement-
ing established technical measures, in comparison to
the level of energy use in a reference scenario, where
current trends continue and no large changes take
place in the production and consumption structure of the
economy. The technical potential scenario assumes that
measures can be implemented after 2010 and that
equipment or installations are replaced at the end of
their lifetime by state-of-the-art equipment. However,
the Revolution scenario assumes that only a fraction of
the technical energy efficiency potential can be imple-
mented. This approach takes into account barriers for
implementing technical measures for energy efficiency
improvements, such as costs. Energy demand in both
the basic and the advanced Energy [R]evolution
scenarios is based on this second, more conservative
“Revolution” scenario. The main results of the “Revo-
lution” scenario are summarised below.
For the 2010 update of the Energy [R]evolution
scenario, including the advanced version, the Graus
and Blomen (2008) analysis has been reconfigured
using the latest IEA statistics from World Energy
Outlook 2009 (IEA 2009a). The WEO 2009 edition
has a lower global final energy demand in 2030 in
comparison to the 2007 edition; 438 EJ in comparison
to 478 EJ (including non-energy use). The difference
is mainly caused by lower GDP growth rates due to
the recent financial and economic crisis, leading to a
14% lower global GDP in 2030 in comparison to the
2007 edition. In addition, an increased share of
electric vehicles in the advanced scenario results in a
lower final energy demand required to meet the same
level of transport activity.
Key drivers for energy demand
Population development
One important underlying factor in energy scenario
building is future population development. Population
growth affects the size and composition of energy
demand, directly and through its impact on economic
growth and development. World Energy Outlook
2009 uses the United Nations Development
Programme (UNPD 2009) projections for population
development. For this study, the most recent popula-
tion projections from UNDP up to 2050 in the
medium variant are applied. Based on UNDP’s 2009
assessment, the world’s population is expected to
grow by 0.86% per year on average over the period
2007 to 2050, from 6.7 billion people in 2007 to more
than 9.1 billion by 2050. Population growth will slow
over the projection period, from an average 1.2% per
2 Definition of Backcasting: Backcasting starts with defining a
desirable future and then works backwards to identify poten-
tials, policies and programmes that will connect the future to
the present. The fundamental question of backcasting asks: “if
we want to attain a certain goal, what actions must be taken and
what development pathways could be followed to get there?”
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year during between 2007 and 2010 to 0.4% per year
between 2040 and 2050. The population of the
developing regions will continue to grow most
rapidly. The Transition Economies will face a contin-
uous decline, followed after a short while by the
OECD Pacific countries. OECD Europe and OECD
North America are expected to maintain their popu-
lation, with a peak in around 2020/2030 and a slight
decline afterwards. The share of the population living
in today’s non-OECD countries will increase from the
current 82% to 85% in 2050. China’s contribution to
world population will drop from 20% today to 16% in
2050. Africa will remain the region with the highest
growth rate, leading to a share of 22% of world
population in 2050. Satisfying the energy needs of a
growing population in the developing regions of the
world in an environmentally friendly manner is a key
challenge for achieving a global sustainable energy
supply.
Economic growth
Economic productivity is a key driver for energy
demand. Since 1971, each 1% increase in global
GDP has been accompanied by a 0.6% increase in
primary energy (Graus and Blomen 2008) con-
sumption. The decoupling of energy demand and
GDP growth is therefore a prerequisite for reducing
demand in the future, if a continuing growth of GDP
is to be achieved. Most global energy/economic/
environmental models constructed in the past have
relied on market exchange rates to place countries in
a common currency for estimation and calibration.
This approach has been the subject of considerable
discussion in recent years, and the alternative of PPP
(Nordhaus 2005) exchange rates has been proposed.
Purchasing power parities compare the costs in
different currencies of a fixed basket of traded and
non-traded goods and services and yield a widely
based measure of the standard of living. This is
important in analysing the main drivers of energy
demand or for comparing energy intensities among
countries. Although PPP assessments are still rela-
tively imprecise compared to statistics based on
national income and product trade and national price
indexes, they are considered to provide a better basis
for global scenario development. In this study, we
relied on PPP adjusted GDP estimates from the
World Energy Outlook 2009 (IEA 2009a). However,
as WEO 2009 only covers the time period up to
2030, the projections for 2030–2050 are based on
our own estimates.
Energy-intensity decrease
An increase in economic activity and a growing
population does not necessarily have to result in an
equivalent increase in energy demand. There is still a
large potential for exploiting energy efficiency meas-
ures. The energy intensity of an economy in this study
is defined as final energy use per unit of gross
domestic product. Under the Reference scenario, we
assume that energy intensity will be reduced by
1.25% on average per year, leading to a reduction in
final energy demand per unit of GDP of about 15%
between 2007 and 2020. This value compares well
with the reduction of the energy intensity of EU-25
between 1990 and 2004 (see below). In comparison,
the total energy consumption in the EU-25 grew at an
annual rate of just over 0.8% over the period from
1990 to 2004, while GDP grew at an average annual
rate of 2.1% during the same period (EEA 2010). As
a result, total energy intensity in the EU-25 fell at an
average rate of −1.2% per year (a total decrease of
−16% between 1990 and 2004). Despite this relative
decoupling, total energy consumption has increased
by 12.0% overall in the period 1990–2004. Energy
intensity declined over 1990–2000 (and continuously
during 1996–2000) but has remained broadly stable
since then. For the entire simulation period (2007 to
2050), an average annual decrease of the energy
intensity of 1.25% results in a total reduction of 56%
in these 53 years. Although the current energy
intensity is very different from region to region, our
study implicitly assumes that all regions will be able
to reduce energy intensity to Japan’s level of 2007
within the next 30 years.
Under the advanced Energy [R]evolution scenario,
it is assumed that active policy and technical support
for energy efficiency measures will lead to an even
higher reduction in energy intensity of almost 73%
between 2007 and 2050. The advanced Energy [R]
evolution scenario follows the same efficiency path-
way, apart from in the transport sector, where a further
reduction of 17% due to less vehicle use and lifestyle
changes has been assumed. The increased share of
electric vehicles in this scenario, with greater effi-
ciency of electric drives, leads to a further decrease in
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final energy use. The energy intensity in an economy
tends to decrease over time as a result of a number of
factors, e.g.
& Autonomous energy efficiency improvement.
These energy efficiency improvements occur
because due to technological developments each
new generation of capital goods is likely to be
more energy efficient than the one before. This is
mainly caused by (temporary) increases in energy
prices from which economic actors try to save on
energy, e.g. by investing in energy efficiency
measures or changing their behaviour.
& Policy-led energy efficiency means economic
actors change their behaviour and invest in more
energy efficient technologies.
& Structural changes in the economy can reduce the
energy over GDP ratio, e.g. a shift in the economy
away from energy-intensive industrial activities to
services related activities.
The energy-intensity decrease in the reference
scenario results from a mix of these three factors
and differs per region and per sector. For the period
2005–2030, the energy-intensity decrease is taken
from the WEO 2009. For the period 2030–2040 and
the period 2040–2050, the development is based on
the energy intensity per region and sector in the
period 2020–2030 in WEO. However, we made a
correction for the change in GDP growth rate per
period to avoid a situation where the energy intensity
decrease in the Reference scenario is larger than the
economic growth rate. For the period 2030–2040 and
2040–2050, the energy intensity decrease is calculated
by the following two formulae:
EI20302040 ¼ EI20202030  GDP20302040=GDP20202030ð Þ
EI20402050 ¼ EI20202030  GDP20402050=GDP20202030ð Þ
where:
EI2020–2030 Energy intensity decrease 2020–2030
in WEO (%/year)
GDP2020–2030 GDP growth rate 2020–2030 in
WEO (%/year)
EI2030–2040 Energy intensity decrease in period
2030–2040 (%/year)
GDP2030–2040 GDP growth rate in period 2030–
2040 (%/year)
EI2040–2050 Energy intensity decrease in period
2040–2050 (%/year)
GDP2040–2050 GDP growth rate in period 2040–
2050 (%/year)
Technical potential for energy efficiency improvement
After defining energy intensities of the Reference
scenario, technical potentials for energy efficiency
improvement are estimated. In this step, a list is
drawn up of energy savings options taken into
account per sector. After that, the technical energy
savings potential is estimated per measure. The
technical potentials are based on:
& Current best practice technologies
& Emerging technologies that are currently under
development
& Continuous innovation in the field of energy
efficiency, leading to new technologies in the
future
The key assumptions for calculating technical
potential are:
& Measures can be implemented after 2010
& Equipment is replaced at the end of the (economic)
lifetime of equipment by state-of-the-art equipment
This study aims at calculating energy efficiency
improvement by developing indicators for energy-
intensity per sector and where possible by subsector.
The main energy consuming sectors are the
industry and transport sectors, as well as “other
sectors”, (residential sectors, services and agriculture;
Graus and Blomen 2008) the subsector energy use
and the selection of the measures per sector are
discussed and shown in detail. Options are selected,
which are expected to result in a substantial reduction
of energy demand before 2050.
In the Reference scenario, total global energy
demand is expected to increase from 305 EJ in 2007
to 352 EJ in 2050. The growth in the transport sector
is projected to be the largest, with energy demand
expected to grow from 82 EJ in 2007 to 158 EJ by
2050 (see Table 1). Demand from “other sectors” is
expected to grow the least, from 124 EJ in 2007 to
198 EJ by 2050. Under the (basic) Energy [R]
evolution scenario, however, growth in overall final
energy demand can be limited to an increase of 12%
up to 2050 in comparison to the 2007 level (341 EJ in
2050), whilst taking into account implementation
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constraints in terms of costs and other barriers. The
increase of the energy demand in the transport sector
is very small, while in the industry and other sectors,
final energy demand increases by ca. 17% (resp. 15%)
between 2007 and 2050.
Figure 1 shows the potential for energy efficiency
measurements for the industry, transport and other
sectors in 2050 for the different world regions, i.e. the
difference between the energy demand in these
sectors in 2050 in the Reference scenario and the
respective demand in the basic E[R] scenario,
normalised to the 2005 level of total energy demand
in each world region. Furthermore, the remaining total
energy demand in 2050 in the basic E[R] scenario
(relative to 2005 levels) is shown.
The technical savings potential up to 2050 from all
the measures described in (Graus and Blomen 2008)
is summarised in Table 2. Since it was not clear what
assumptions the IEA WEO Reference scenario was
based on, they have assumed an efficiency improve-
ment of 1% per year. Electricity use in the “other”
sector was assumed to decline at the same rate as
residential use (lighting, appliances, cold appliances,
computers/servers and air conditioning). They have
assumed a minimum energy efficiency improvement
of 1.2% in the Technical scenario and 1.1% in their
Revolution scenario, including autonomous improve-
ments. For services and agriculture, they have
assumed the same percentage savings potential as
for the household sector all aggregated in “other
sectors”. The new Reference scenario based on
WEO 2009 data now includes a lower level of
energy demand in the residential sector. Therefore
the savings used in the new Energy [R]evolution
scenarios are lower than the figures shown in
Table 2. The resulting final energy demand reduction
for the Energy [R]evolution scenarios compared to
the Reference scenario is shown in Table 3 for each
world region.
Estimates of the potential of renewable energy
sources
Worldwide renewable energy resources exceed by
several times current energy demand. The availability
of renewable energy sources however differ between
world regions (UBA 2009). The supply with energy
from renewable sources in the both the basic and the
advanced Energy [R]evolution scenarios is con-
strained by estimates of renewable energy potentials
by world region and technology (REN21 (2008);
Hoogwijk and Graus (2008) and UBA (2009)).
Assessments of the global technical potential vary
significantly up to 15,857 EJ/a (UBA 2009). This
Table 1 Change in global final energy demand by 2050 in
comparison to 2005 level
Sector Energy [R]evolution Reference
2007 2050 2007 2050
Industry 99 EJ 116 EJ 99 EJ 176 EJ
Transport 82 EJ 84 EJ 82 EJ 158 EJ
Buildings and
others
124 EJ 142 EJ 124 EJ 198 EJ
Total 305 EJ 341 EJ 305 EJ 532 EJ
Fig. 1 Potential for energy
efficiency improvements
per world regions in the
Energy [R]evolution
scenarios by 2050: Saved
energy in the industry,
transport and other sectors
as well as the remaining
final energy demand (by
2050, relative to 2007
levels) in the basic Energy
[R]evolution scenario, com-
pared with the reference
scenario
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meta study performed by the DLR, Wuppertal
Institute and Ecofys, commissioned by the German
Federal Environment Agency analysed ten major
studies of global and regional potentials by organ-
isations such as the United Nations Development
Programme and a range of academic institutions.
Each of the major renewable energy sources was
assessed, with special attention paid to the effect of
environmental constraints on their overall potential.
The study provides data for the years 2020, 2030 and
2050. The potential for energy supply from biomass
in each world region was addressed separately from
the results in the UBA (2009) study (see below).
Sustainable biomass potential
Bio energy is an important storable renewable energy
source. However, the use of bio energy is controver-
sial and a sustainable fuel supply chain is crucial. The
limited availability of sustainable bio energy requires
very efficient use especially for heating and cooling in
cogeneration power plants, where overall efficiency is
far higher than biomass use in the transport system (in
combustion engines). As a response to the controver-
sial discussion on the availability of biomass resour-
ces, a study on the global potential for sustainable
biomass was commissioned as part of the Energy [R]
evolution 2008 project (Seidenberger et al. 2008). The
German Biomass Research Centre, the former Insti-
tute for Energy and Environment, compiled research
into worldwide energy crop potentials in different
scenarios till 2050. Additionally, scientific literature
on the status quo of worldwide potential studies and the
state of the art of remote sensing for investigation of
biomass potentials was compiled by Seidenberger et al.
(2008). As the results of the Seidenberger et al. (2008)
study are not publicly available, the key results of this
study are summarised in the following paragraphs:
Global potentials of biomass residues
Residues are products from forestry, agricultural
waste and by-products from food production as
well as waste from wood products and animals.
Residues can be dry matter, e.g. wood chips as well
as wet matter, e.g. animal waste. The share of each
residue is a fraction of the total amount of residual












OECD Europe 72 50 82 68 70 77 70 70 71
OECD N.-Am. 59 41 48 67
OECD Pac. 38 26 56 69
Transition Ec. 56 39 76 73






Table 3 Reduction of final energy demand in other sectors







OECD Europe −46% −36%
OECD North America −42% −28%
OECD Pacific −33% −28%
Transition economies −45% −36%
China −27% −23%
India −12% −29%
Other developing Asia −39% −15%
Middle America −36% −15%
Latin America −16% −18%
Africa −6% −7%
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biomass can vary in different regions and is mainly
dependent on the population, living standards and
the methods and intensity of the agricultural and
forestry production in the particular region. Several
studies analysing long-term residue potential in a
more or less detailed way are available. A direct
comparison of the studies is difficult, since the
baseline assumptions are different.
Following Seidenberger et al. (2008), we used
results from Dessus et al. (1993) for 2020, as it is the
only study with region-specific residue potentials for
2020. For 2050, biomass residuals potential is based
on Smeets et al. (2007) as the authors have defined
sustainability criteria in their assessment. Moreover,
Smeets et al. (2007) offer a relatively high level of
transparency and traceability from the methodological
point of view. Nevertheless, it must be pointed out
that the calculated potentials seem to be conservative
and were partly converted from the original aggrega-
tion necessary for our scenario analysis, which is
listed below in Table 4. Because of the lack of data,
the Asian region is most problematic.
Global potentials of energy crops
Besides the utilisation of biomass from residues, the
production of energy crops in agricultural production
systems is of controversial. Therefore, the technical
potentials of energy crops were calculated assuming
that the demand for food takes priority. In a first step,
different scenarios for the demand of arable land and
grassland for food production were calculated for
each of 133 countries.
– BAU scenario: Agricultural conditions existing at
present time also apply for the future.
– Basic scenario: No forest clearing; reduced use of
fallow areas for agriculture
– Sub 1 scenario: Basic scenario + ecological area
expanded, followed by reduced yield level
Table 4 Residue potentials by region, based on Dessus et al. (1993) and Smeets et al. (2007)










OECD Europe 6.4b 0.5d 7.0 7.0 e 0.5d 7.5
OECD North America 11.3b 0.5d 11.8 17.0 e 0.6d 17.6
OECD Pacific 2.3b 0.2d 2.5 6.0 e 0.2d 6.2
Transition economies 4.8b 0.3d 5.1 5.0 e 0.3d 5.3
China 5.6c 1.4d 7.0 6.3 f 1.4d 7.7
India 3.6c 1.3d 4.9 6.3 f 1.5d 7.8
Rest of Asia 9.3b 1.2d 10.5 6.4 e 1.6d 8.0
Latin America 5.6b 0.5d 6.1 12.0 e 0.6d 12.6
Africaa 1.9b 1.1d 3.0 12.3 e 1.5d 13.8
Middle Easta 0.4b 0.2d 0.6 0.7 e 0.4d 1.1
World 51.2 7.4 58.6 79.0 8.6 87.6
a In both studies, the original division is “Sub-Saharan Africa” and “Middle East and North Africa”, the division in “Africa” and
“Middle East” is calculated on the basis of population
b Original data of the category “residues” in Dessus et al. (1993) plus the values of “forest residues” in Smeets et al. (2007) minus 10%
c “residues” of Dessus et al. (1993) plus forest residues which are calculated by the following method: On the basis of FAO data the
development of forest area is estimated. With the data “forest residues” of Smeets et al. (2007) for “East Asia” and “Southeast Asia”
data for China and India are calculated
d Potential of wet residues is assumed by the estimated factor of 1 PJ per one million people
e Original data of Smeets et al. (2007)
f Smeets et al. (2007) gives potentials for East Asia (included China) and South and Southeast Asia (included India). Following these
data, the potentials for China and India are calculated on the basis of population data. 70% of the potential (9 EJ) are in India, 63% of
the potential (10 EJ) are in China
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– Sub 2 scenario: Basic scenario + food consump-
tion is reduced for industrialised countries
– Sub 3 scenario: combination of Sub 1 and 2
scenarios
The needs and surpluses of agricultural areas are
balanced between the countries of the groups EU-
27, other European countries, North America,
Central America, South America, Oceania, Asia
and Africa to estimate the area available for the
cultivation of energy crops in each world region. In
a next step, the surpluses of agricultural area in
each world region are classified as arable land and
grassland. On grassland hay and grass silage are
produced, on arable land fodder silage3 and short
rotation coppice4 (SRC) are cultivated. Silage of
green fodder and grass are assumed for biogas
production, wood from SRC and hay from grass-
lands are assumed for the production of heat,
electricity and synthetic fuels (BtL5 or ethanol from
lignocelluloses).6 Country specific yield develop-
ments are taken into consideration.
As a result, the global biomass potential from
energy crops in 2050 was estimated to range from
6 EJ in the Sub 1 scenario to 97 EJ in the BAU
scenario (see Fig. 2). In comparison to the BAU
scenario, potentials decrease clearly in the Basic and
Sub 1 scenario, and the lowest potentials exist in the
Sub 1 scenario. The considerable higher demand of
agricultural area in the Sub 1 scenario compared to
the Basic and the BAU scenario is due to an
ecological orientated agriculture with less fertilizer
and less pesticide and therefore lower specific yields.
In the Sub 2 scenario, considerable higher energy
crop potentials can be released by changing the
human food pattern, reducing meat consumption and
consequently, the area necessary for fodder produc-
tion. Also in the Sub 3 scenario, considerable
potentials can be realized, in most cases even higher
than in the BAU scenario. The most important
country for the differences between the scenarios in
2050 is Brazil. In the BAU scenario, big agricultural
areas are released by deforestation in Brazil, whereas
in the Basic and Sub 1 scenario, this deforestation
does not occur anymore. Consequently, no additional
agricultural area for energy crops is available in Brazil
in these two scenarios. In contrast high potentials are
available in the Sub 2 scenario as a consequence of
the reduced meat consumption of the Brazilian.
Because of high population and low quantity of
agricultural area, no area surpluses for energy crop
production are available in Central America, Asia and
Africa. However, the EU, North America and Australia
have relatively stable potentials.
The Basic and Sub 3 scenario are of particular
importance, since the Basic scenario would be the
“minimum solution” for future agriculture. The Sub 3
scenario demonstrates the development of an ecolog-
ical orientated agriculture. But such a development is
only realistic, if the eating behaviour changes.
Otherwise, the higher demand of food crops from an
increasing world population cannot be compensated.
The results of the calculation show that the availability
of biomass resources is driven by different factors (as
evident in the boundary conditions set in the different
scenarios above), which do not only affect the global
food situation but also the conservation of natural
forests and other biospheres. So, the assessment of
future biomass potentials is the starting point for the
discussion about the integration of bio energy into a
renewable energy system.
Global total potential for biomass for energy
purposes
The total global biomass potential (energy crops and
residues) in 2020 ranges from 66 EJ (Sub scenario 1)
to 110 EJ (Sub scenario 2). For 2050, scenario results
range from 94 EJ (Sub scenario 1) to 184 EJ (BAU
scenario). Those numbers are conservative calcula-
tions and have an estimated uncertainty, especially for
in 2050, of a factor of two. Reasons for this
4 Short rotation coppice (SRC) are fast growing tree species
(e.g. willow, poplar, eucalyptus), harvested usually every
3 years. The wood chips can use for heat, electricity
production and for lignocelluloses fuels.
3 Arable land fodder silage: Fodder crops are harvested green
and conserved as silage. This silage can be used for biogas
production.
6 Lignocellulosic biomass refers to plant biomass that is
composed of cellulose, hemicellulose and lignin. The carbohy-
drate polymers (cellulose and hemicelluloses) are tightly bound
to the lignin. Lignocellulosic biomass can be grouped into four
main categories: (1) agricultural residues (including corn stover
and sugarcane bagasse), (2) dedicated energy crops, (3) wood
residues (including sawmill and paper mill discards), and (4)
municipal paper waste.
5 Biomass to liquid (BTL) or BMTL is a multi-step process to
produce liquid biofuels from biomass.
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uncertainty are due to the unknown consequences of
climate change on agricultural production, possible
changes of the worldwide political and economical
dynamics, a higher yield increase as a consequence of
a change in agricultural techniques and/or the faster
development in plant breeding. The global potential
for biomass residues is estimated to be 88 EJ in 2050
(see Table 4). With a biomass consumption of 88.7 EJ
in 2050, the Energy [R]evolution scenario complies
with the most stringent requirements towards sustain-
able biomass use.
Economic boundary conditions
To implement the Energy [R]evolution pathways, an
assessment of costs and benefits for society is
essential. For this study, we focused on the costs of
the power sector, calculating power generation costs
as well as necessary investments and fuel costs for
each scenario. The main assumptions for the cost
calculation are presented in the following: Assump-
tions for heat and transport prices require a much
more detailed approach for each region, thus were not
included in the economic assessment.
Fuel price projections
The recent dramatic fluctuations in global oil prices
have resulted in slightly higher forward price projec-
tions for fossil fuels. Under the 2004 “high oil and gas
price” scenario from the European Commission, for
example, an oil price of just $34 per barrel was
assumed in 2030. More recent projections of oil
prices by 2030 in the World Energy Outlook (IEA
2009a) range from $2008 80/bbl in the lower prices
sensitivity case and up to $2008 150/bbl in the higher
prices sensitivity case. The Reference scenario in
WEO 2009 assumes an oil price of $2008 115/bbl.
Since the first Energy [R]evolution study was
published in 2007, however, the actual price of oil
has moved over $100/bbl for the first time, and in
July 2008 reached a record high of more than $140/bbl.
Although oil prices fell back to $100/bbl in September
2008 and around $80/bbl in April 2010, the projections
in the IEA reference scenario might still be considered
too conservative. Taking into account the growing
global demand for oil, we have assumed a price
development path for fossil fuels based on the IEA
WEO 2009 higher prices sensitivity case extrapo-
lated forward to 2050 (see Table 5). As the supply
of natural gas is limited by the availability of
pipeline infrastructure, there is no world market
price. In most regions of the world, the gas price is
directly tied to the price of oil. As a consequence,
gas prices used in this study are assumed to increase
to $24–29/GJ by 2050. Additional price projections
for biomass considered that biomass from energy
crops are mainly available in the industrialised
countries, especially in Europe as calculated by
Seidenberger et al. (2008). Thus, biomass prices in
Europe are assumed to be much higher than prices
for residual biomass in the other regions.




































































































































































Fig. 2 World wide energy crop potentials in different scenarios in 2050 (Seidenberger et al. 2008)
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Cost of CO2 emissions
Assuming that a CO2 emission trading system will be
established across all world regions in the longer
term, the cost of CO2 allowances needs to be included
in the calculation of electricity generation costs.
Projections of emissions costs are even more uncer-
tain than energy prices, however, and available
studies span a broad range of future estimates. As in
the previous Energy [R]evolution study, we assume
CO2 costs of $10/tCO2 in 2015, rising to $50/tCO2 by
2050. Additional CO2 costs are applied in Kyoto
Protocol Non-Annex B (developing) countries only
after 2020. The cost projections for CO2 are relatively
conservative due to the fact that a global emission
trading system requires a strong and ambitious
mandatory framework to reduce global energy related
CO2 emissions. However, the UNFCCC conference in
Copenhagen in December 2009 failed to agree on
such legally binding targets, and a global emission
trading scheme will require several more years of
negotiations.
Projections of future investment costs for power
generation
Fossil fuel power plants Although the fossil fuel
power technologies in use today for coal, gas, lignite
and oil are established and at an advanced stage of
market development, further cost reduction potentials
for conventional power technologies are assumed.
The potential for cost reductions is limited, however,
and will be achieved mainly through an increase in
efficiency. Table 6 summarises our assumptions on
the technical and economic parameters of future
fossil-fuelled power plant technologies. In spite of
Table 5 Fossil fuel and biomass price assumptions for the three scenarios (in US$ 2008)
Unit 2000 2005 2007 2008 2010 2015 2020 2025 2030 2040 2050
Crude oil imports
IEA WEO 2009 “Reference” barrel 34.30 50.00 75.00 97.19 86.67 100 107.5 115
USA EIA 2008 “Reference” barrel 86.64 69.96 82.53
USA EIA 2008 “High Price” barrel 92.56 119.75 138.96
Energy [R]evolution barrel 110.56 130.00 140.00 150.00 150.00 150.00
Natural gas imports
IEA WEO 2009 “Reference”
United States GJ 5.00 2.32 3.24 8.25 7.29 8.87 10.04 11.36
Europe GJ 3.70 4.49 6.29 10.32 10.46 12.10 13.09 14.02
Japan LNG GJ 6.10 4.52 6.33 12.64 11.91 13.75 14.83 15.87
Energy [R]evolution 2010
United States GJ 3.24 8.70 10.70 12.40 14.38 18.10 23.73
Europe GJ 6.29 10.89 16.56 17.99 19.29 22.00 26.03
Japan LNG GJ 6.33 13.34 18.84 20.37 21.84 24.80 29.30
Hard coal imports
OECD steam coal imports
Energy [R]evolution 2010 tonne 69.45 120.59 116.15 135.41 139.50 142.70 160.00 172.30
IEA WEO 2009 “Reference” tonne 41.22 49.61 69.45 120.59 91.05 104.16 107.12 109.4
Biomass (solid)
Energy [R]evolution 2010
OECD Europe GJ 7.4 7.7 8.2 9.2 10.0 10.3 10.5
OECD Pacific and North America GJ 3.3 3.4 3.5 3.8 4.3 4.7 5.2
Other regions GJ 2.7 2.8 3.2 3.5 4.0 4.6 4.9
Source 2000–2030, IEA WEO 2009 higher prices sensitivity case for crude oil, gas and steam coal; 2040–2050 and other fuels, own
assumptions
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growing raw material prices, we assume that further
technical innovation will result in a moderate reduc-
tion of future investment costs as well as improved
power plant efficiencies. These improvements are,
however, outweighed by the expected increase in
fossil fuel prices, resulting in a significant rise in
electricity generation costs.
Renewable technologies In contrast to fossil fuel
power technologies, renewable energy technologies
still have considerable cost reduction potentials.
Table 7 summarises the assumptions for cost trends
for renewable power technologies as derived from the
respective extrapolated learning curves. It should be
emphasised that the expected cost reduction is
basically not a function of time, but of cumulative
capacity, so dynamic market development is required.
Most of the technologies will be able to reduce their
specific investment costs between 30% and 70% of
current levels by 2020 and between 20% and 60%
once they have achieved full maturity (after 2040).
This would continue the historical developments,
where solar photovoltaic modules decreased the costs
over 50% between 1990 and 2001 (EC European
Commission 2005), while specific costs for wind
turbine went down from US $2,700/kW to US
$1,500/kW between 1982 and 2009 (Nielson et al.
2010) Reduced investment costs for renewable energy
technologies lead directly to reduce heat and electric-
ity generation costs. Electricity generation costs today
are around $0.8 to $0.26 cents/kWh for the most
important technologies, with the exception of photo-
voltaic. In the long term, costs are expected to
converge at around $0.5 to $0.12 cents/kWh (includ-
ing photovoltaic). These estimates depend on site-
specific conditions such as the local wind regime or
solar irradiation, the availability of biomass at
reasonable prices or the credit granted for heat supply
in the case of combined heat and power generation.
Estimation of job effects Greenpeace engaged the
Australian-based Institute for Sustainable Futures to
model the employment effects of our 2009 sustainable
future energy scenario compared to business as usual.
The results, published in 2009 as “Working for the
climate—Renewable Energy & The Green Job [R]
evolution”, form the basis for the calculations in the
2010 Energy [R]evolution scenarios. The model
calculates indicative numbers for jobs that would
either be created or lost under both the Energy [R]
evolution and Reference scenarios. This requires a
series of assumptions summarised below.
& Start with the amount of electrical capacity that
would be installed each year and the amount of
electricity generated per year under the Reference
Table 6 Development of efficiency and investment costs for selected fossil power plant technologies
2007 2015 2020 2030 2040 2050
Coal-fired condensing
power plant
Efficiency (%) 45 46 48 50 52 53
Investment costs ($/kW) 1,320 1,230 1,190 1,160 1,130 1,100
Electricity generation costs including
CO2 emission costs ($CENTS/kWh)
6.6 9.0 10.8 12.5 14.2 15.7
CO2 Emission
a (g/kW) 744 728 697 670 644 632
Lignite-fired condensing
power plant
Efficiency (%) 41 43 44 44.5 45 45
Investment costs ($/kW) 1,570 1,440 1,380 1,350 1,320 1,290
Electricity generation costs including
CO2 emission costs ($CENTS/kWh)
5.9 6.5 7.5 8.4 9.3 10.3
CO2 Emission
a (g/kW) 975 929 908 898 888 888
Natural gas combined
cycle
Efficiency (%) 57 59 61 62 63 64
Investment costs ($/kW) 690 675 645 610 580 550
Electricity generation costs including
CO2 emission costs ($CENTS/kWh)
7.5 10.5 12.7 15.3 17.4 18.9
CO2 Emission
a (g/kW) 354 342 330 325 320 315
Source DLR, 2010
a CO2 emissions refer to power station outputs only; life-cycle emission are not considered
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Table 7 Projected cost development for renewable power generation technologies, market volumes and investments
2007 2015 2020 2030 2040 2050
Photovoltaics (pv)
Energy [R]evolution
Global installed capacity GW 6 98 335 1,036 1,915 2,968
Investment costs $/kWp 3,746 2,610 1,776 1,027 785 761
Operation and maintenance costs $/kW/a 66 38 16 13 11 10
Advanced Energy [R]evolution
Global installed capacity GW 6 108 439 1,330 2,959 4,318
Investment costs $/kWp 3,746 2,610 1,776 1,027 761 738
Operation and maintenance costs $/kW/a 66 38 16 13 11 10
Concentrating solar power (CSP)
Energy [R]evolution
Global installed capacity GW 1 25 105 324 647 1,002
Investment costs $/kWp 7,250 5,576 5,044 4,263 4,200 4,160
Operation and maintenance costs $/kW/a 300 250 210 180 160 155
Advanced Energy [R]evolution
Global installed capacity GW 1 28 225 605 1,173 1,643
Investment costs $/kWp 7,250 5,576 5,044 4,200 4,160 4,121
Operation and maintenance costs $/kW/a 300 250 210 180 160 155
Wind power
Energy [R]evolution
Global installed capacity (on + offshore) GW 95 407 878 1,733 2,409 2,943
Investment costs—onshore $/kWp 1,510 1,255 998 952 906 894
Operation and maintenance costs—onshore $/kW/a 58 51 45 43 41 41
Investment costs—offshore $/kWp 2,900 2,200 1,540 1,460 1,330 1,305
Operation and maintenance costs—offshore $/kW/a 166 153 114 97 88 83
Advanced Energy [R]evolution
Global installed capacity (on + offshore) GW 95 494 1,140 2,241 3,054 3,754
Investment costs—onshore $/kWp 1,510 1,255 998 906 894 882
Operation and maintenance costs—onshore $/kW/a 58 51 45 43 41 41
Investment costs—offshore $/kWp 2,900 2,200 1,540 1,460 1,330 1,305
Operation and maintenance costs—offshore $/kW/a 166 153 114 97 88 83
Biomass
Energy [R]evolution
Global installed capacity—electricity only GW 28 48 62 75 87 107
Investment costs $/kWp 2,818 2,452 2,435 2,377 2,349 2,326
Operation and maintenance costs $/kW/a 183 166 152 148 147 146
Global installed capacity—CHP GW 18 67 150 261 413 545
Investment costs $/kWp 5,250 4,255 3,722 3,250 2,996 2,846
Operation and maintenance costs $/kW/a 404 348 271 236 218 207
Advanced Energy [R]evolution
Global installed capacity—electricity only GW 28 50 64 78 83 81
Investment costs $/kWp 2,818 2,452 2,435 2,377 2,349 2,326
Operation and maintenance costs $/kW/a 183 166 152 148 147 146
Global installed capacity—CHP GW 18 65 150 265 418 540
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(business as usual) and the two Energy [R]
evolution scenarios.
& Use “employment factors” for each technology,
which are the number of jobs per unit of electrical
capacity (fossil as well as renewable), separated
into manufacturing, construction, operation and
maintenance and fuel supply.
& Take into account the “local manufacturing” and
“domestic fuel production” for each region, in
order to allocate the level of local jobs, and also to
allocate imports to other regions.
& Multiply the electrical capacity and generation
figures by the employment factors for each of the
energy technologies.
Table 7 (continued)
2007 2015 2020 2030 2040 2050
Investment costs $/kWp 5,250 4,255 3,722 3,250 2,996 2,846
Operation and maintenance costs $/kW/a 404 348 271 236 218 207
Geothermal
Energy [R]evolution
Global installed capacity—electricity only GW 10 19 36 71 114 144
Investment costs $/kWp 12,446 10,875 9,184 7,250 6,042 5,196
Operation and maintenance costs $/kW/a 645 557 428 375 351 332
Global installed capacity—CHP GW 1 3 13 37 83 134
Investment costs $/kWp 12,688 11,117 9,425 7,492 6,283 5,438
Operation and maintenance costs $/kW/a 647 483 351 294 256 233
Advanced Energy [R]evolution
Global installed capacity—electricity only GW 10 21 57 191 337 459
Investment costs $/kWp 12,446 10,875 9,184 5,196 4,469 3,843
Operation and maintenance costs $/kW/a 645 557 428 375 351 332
Global installed capacity—CHP GW 0 3 13 47 132 234
Investment costs $/kWp 12,688 11,117 9,425 7,492 6,283 5,438
Operation and maintenance costs $/kW/a 647 483 351 294 256 233
Ocean energy
Energy [R]evolution
Global installed capacity GW 0 9 29 73 168 303
Investment costs $/kWp 7,216 3,892 2,806 2,158 1,802 1,605
Operation and maintenance costs $/kW/a 360 207 117 89 75 66
Advanced Energy [R]evolution
Global installed capacity GW 0 9 58 180 425 748
Investment costs $/kWp 7,216 3,892 2,806 1,802 1,605 1,429
Operation and maintenance costs $/kW/a 360 207 117 89 75 66
Hydro
Energy [R]evolution
Global installed capacity GW 922 1,043 1,206 1,307 1,387 1,438
Investment costs $/kWp 2,705 2,864 2,952 3,085 3,196 3,294
Operation and maintenance costs $/kW/a 110 115 123 128 133 137
Advanced Energy [R]evolution
Global installed capacity GW 922 1,111 1,212 1,316 1,406 1,451
Investment costs $/kWp 2,705 2,864 2,952 3,085 3,196 3,294
Operation and maintenance costs $/kW/a 110 115 123 128 133 137
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& For non-OECD regions, apply a “regional job
multiplier”, which adjusts the OECD employment
factors for different levels of labour-intensity in
different parts of the world. Regional factors are
used for coal mining, so no regional adjustment is
needed in this case.
& For the 2020 and 2030 calculations, reduce the
employment factors by a “decline factor” for each
technology; this reflects how employment falls as
technology efficiencies improve.
The model used a range of inputs, including data from
the International Energy Agency, US Energy Informa-
tion Association, European Renewable Energy Council,
European Wind Energy Association, US National
Renewable Energy Laboratory, Renewable Energy
Policy Project, census data from the United States,
Australia and Canada and the International Labour
Organisation. These calculations only take into account
direct employment, for example the construction team
needed to build a new wind farm. They do not cover
indirect employment, for example, the extra services
provided in a town to accommodate construction teams.
Key results
Energy demand and energy generation
Today, renewable energy sources account for 13% of the
world’s primary energy demand. Biomass, which is
mostly used in the heat sector, is the main source. The
share of renewable energies for electricity generation is
18%, while their contribution to heat supply is around
24%, to a large extent accounted for by traditional uses
such as collected firewood. About 80% of the primary
energy supply today still comes from fossil fuels (IEA
2009b, c). Both Energy [R]evolution scenarios
describe development pathways that turn the present
situation into a more sustainable energy supply. The
advanced version takes into account that achieving the
urgently needed CO2 reduction target might be neces-
sary more than a decade earlier than implemented in
the basic Energy [R]evolution scenario. The following
summary shows the results of the advanced Energy [R]
evolution scenario, which will be achieved through the
following measures:
& Exploitation of existing large energy efficiency
potentials will lead to an only slightly increased
final energy demand in the Energy [R]evolution
scenarios—from the current 305 EJ/a (2007) to
341 EJ/a in 2050, compared to 531.5 EJ/a in the
Reference scenario. This dramatic reduction is a
crucial prerequisite for a significant share of
renewable energy sources in the overall energy
supply system in the future, compensating for the
phasing out of nuclear energy and reducing the
consumption of fossil fuels.
& More electric drives are used in the transport
sector as well as hydrogen produced by electrol-
ysis from excess renewable electricity. Compared
to the basic Energy [R]evolution scenario, they
play a much bigger role in the advanced Energy
[R]evolution scenario. After 2020, the final
energy share of electric vehicles on the road
increases to 4% and by 2050 to over 50%. More
public transport systems also use electricity, as
well as a greater shift in transporting freight from
road to rail is implemented.
& The increased use of CHP also improves the
supply system’s energy conversion efficiency,
increasingly using CO2 favourable natural gas
and biomass instead of coal. However, CHP is
limited by the available heat demand. In the long
term, efficiency measures decrease demand for
heat and also the large potential for producing
heat directly from renewable energy sources limit
the further expansion of CHP.
& The electricity sector will be the pioneer of
renewable energy utilisation. By 2050, around
95% of electricity can be produced from renew-
able sources in the Energy [R]evolution scenarios.
A capacity of 14,045 GW will produce
43,922 TWh/a of renewable electricity in 2050.
A significant share of the fluctuating power
generation from wind and solar photovoltaic will
be used to supply electricity to vehicle batteries
and produce hydrogen as a secondary fuel in
transport and industry. Load management strate-
gies are a precondition to reduce excess electricity
generation and more balancing power is then
made available.
& In the heat supply sector, the Energy [R]evolution
scenarios increase contribution of renewables to
91% by 2050. Fossil fuels will be increasingly
replaced by more efficient modern renewable
technologies, in particular biomass, solar collectors
and geothermal. Geothermal heat pumps and, in the
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world’s sunbelt regions, concentrating solar power,
will play a growing part in industrial heat supply.
& In the transport sector, the existing large efficiency
potentials will be exploited by a modal shift from
road to rail and by using much lighter and smaller
vehicles. As biomass is mainly committed to
stationary applications, the production of bio fuels
is limited by the availability of sustainable raw
materials. Electric vehicles, powered by renew-
able energy sources, will play an increasingly
important role from 2020 onwards.
& By 2050, in the Energy [R]evolution scenarios
80% of primary energy demand will be covered
by renewable energy sources. Figure 3 shows the
development of the energy supply mix between
2007 and 2050 in three different scenarios.
Development of CO2 emissions
While CO2 emissions worldwide will increase by
more than 60% under the Reference scenario up to
2050, and are thus far from a sustainable development
path, under the advanced Energy [R]evolution sce-
nario, they will decrease from 28,400 million tonnes
in 2007 (including international aviation and marine
bunkers) to 3,700 in 2050, 82% below 1990 levels.
Annual global per capita emissions will drop from 4.1
to 0.4 tonnes/capita. In spite of the phasing out of
nuclear energy and a growing electricity demand,
CO2 emissions will substantially decrease in the
electricity sector. In the long run, efficiency gains
and the increased use of renewable electric vehicles,
as well as a sharp expansion in public transport, will
even reduce CO2 emissions in the transport sector.
With a share of 42% of total emissions in 2050, the
transport sector will reduce significantly but remain
the largest source of CO2 emissions—followed by the
industry sector and power generation.
Results of the economic assessment
Future costs for efficiency measures
Renewable energy will initially cost more to imple-
ment than existing power and heat generation. The
slightly higher electricity generation costs under the
advanced Energy [R]evolution scenario will be
compensated for, however, by reduced demand for
fuels in other sectors such as heating and transport.
Assuming average costs of 3 cents/kWh for imple-
menting energy efficiency measures, the additional
cost for electricity supply under the advanced Energy
[R]evolution scenario will amount to a maximum of
$31 billion/a in 2020. These additional costs, which
represent society’s investment in an environmentally
benign, safe and economic energy supply, continue to
decrease after 2020. By 2050 the annual costs of
electricity supply will be $2,700 billion/a below those
in the Reference scenario.
Fig. 3 Global development of primary energy consumption under three scenarios
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Future investment in renewable power technologies
Global investments of $17.9 trillion would be
required until 2030 in the power sector for the
advanced Energy [R]evolution scenario to become
reality—approximately 60% higher than in the Ref-
erence scenario ($11.2 trillion). Under the Reference
version, the levels of investment in renewable energy
and fossil fuels are almost equal—about $5 trillion
each—up to 2030. Under the advanced scenario,
however, the world shifts about 80% of investment
towards renewables; by 2030, the fossil fuel share of
power sector investment would be focused mainly on
combined heat and power and efficient gas-fired
power plants. The average annual investment in the
power sector under the advanced Energy [R]evolution
scenario between 2007 and 2030 would be approxi-
mately $782 billion. Compared to a total of $491
billion annually in average in the reference scenario,
only $291 billion would be additional investment.
In turn, the investment in renewable technologies
will lead to a significant saving of fossil fuels. Because
most renewable energy has no fuel demand, the fuel cost
savings in the advanced Energy [R]evolution scenario
reach a total of $6.5 trillion or $282 billion per year until
2030 and a total of $41.5 trillion or an average of $964
billion per year until 2050. However, the investments
are just compensated for on the long run. Over the whole
projection period fuel saving will compensate for most
of the renewable power investment.
The additional annual investment for the advanced
Energy [R]evolution scenario is equal to 1.37% of
global GDP.7 In case a decarbonisation of the energy
system does not take place, the human and financial price
caused by climate change could be enormous. The report
“Silent Crisis” by the Global Humanitarian Forum (GHF
2009) indicates that every year climate change leaves
over 300,000 people dead, 325 million people seriously
affected and economic losses of US $125 billion.
Future global direct employment
Job effects of the Energy [R]evolution scenarios were
calculated in comparison to the Reference Scenario
(see the “Key results” section). Worldwide, both of
the Energy [R]evolution scenarios would create more
direct jobs the power sector than the reference case.
& By 2015, global power supply sector jobs in the
Energy [R]evolution scenario are estimated to
reach about 11.1 million, 3.1 million more than in
the Reference scenario. The advanced version will
lead to 12.5 million jobs by 2015.
& By 2020 in the Energy [R]evolution scenario,
over 6.5 million jobs in the renewables sector
would be created due to a much faster uptake of
renewables, three-times more than today. The
advanced version will lead to about one million
jobs more than the basic Energy [R]evolution.
& By 2030, the Energy [R]evolution scenario
achieves about 10.6 million jobs, about two
million more than the Reference scenario. Ap-
proximately two million new jobs are created
between 2020 and 2030, twice as much as in the
Reference case. The advanced scenario will lead
to 12 million jobs, that is 8.5 million in the
renewables sector alone. Without this fast growth
in the renewable sector, global power jobs will be
a mere 2.4 million. Thus, by implementing the
Energy [R]evolution, there will be 3.2 million or
over 33% more jobs by 2030 in the global power
supply sector.
Shifting towards an efficient use of renewables—a
sustainable global energy supply perspective
The Energy [R]evolution scenario is a “bottom-up”
scenario, driven by technology development in the
various sectors. This contrasts approaches imple-
menting cost-driven top-down approaches. Around
the world, however, energy modelling scenario
tools are under constant development and in the
future, both approaches are likely to merge into
one, with detailed tools employing both a high
level of technical detail and economic optimisation.
The Energy [R]evolution scenario uses a “classical”
bottom-up model which has been constantly further
developed, and now includes calculations covering
both the investment pathway in the power sector
and the employment effect. For the Energy [R]
evolution scenarios, feasible development pathways
for renewable power markets were analysed togeth-
er with EREC.
Feasibility of renewable growth rates Assumed
growth rates for renewable energy technology de-7 IMF 2009, world GDP 2009 (ppp): US$ 70.21 trillion.
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ployment are important drivers (Neij 2008). Within
the range of the feasible market development for the
power sector, the Energy [R]evolution scenarios
tabbed the enormous potential of renewable power.
Table 8 shows growth rates and the global annual
market volumes for new installed capacities in the
power generation for the Energy [R]evolution scenarios.
They are compared with the respective development of
the reference scenario as derived from IEA World
Energy Outlook (2009a, b, c).
Challenging the business model of today’s utilities
The Energy [R]evolution scenario will also result in a
dramatic change in the business model of energy
companies, utilities, fuel suppliers and the manufac-
turers of energy technologies. Decentralised energy
generation and large solar or offshore wind projects
which operate in remote areas, without the need for
any fuel, will have a profound impact on the way
utilities operate in 2020 and beyond. While today the
entire power supply value chain is broken down into
clearly defined players, a global renewable power
supply will inevitably change this division of roles
and responsibilities. Today’s value chain will signif-
icantly change with revolutionised energy mix. While
today, a relatively small number of power plants
owned and operated by utilities or their subsidiaries
are needed to generate the required electricity, the
Energy [R]evolution scenario projects a future share
of around 60% to 70% of small but numerous
decentralised power plants performing the same task.
Ownership will therefore shift towards more private
investors and away from centralised utilities. In turn,
the value chain for power companies will shift
towards project development, equipment manufactur-
ing and operation and maintenance.
Future business models for a decentralised
energy supply will have to take into account that
power plants are distributed and in many cases in/
on buildings or on land that is not owned by the
utilities. Therefore, operation and maintenance will
be distributed and the power plants will be
controlled over long distances most likely via
internet. Project development and to some extent
installation of power generators will play a much
larger role for a utility than it plays with relatively
few but large scale power plants. Fuel supply will
play a smaller role as well.
Conclusions
The Energy [R]evolution scenarios define low energy
demand projections for energy efficiency improvement.
The basis for the energy demand projection is a
reference scenario based on IEA WEO 2007 edition
(updated on the WEO 2009) and extrapolated to 2050
by GDP growth and assumptions regarding energy-
intensity decrease. In the reference scenario, worldwide
final energy demand increases from 305 EJ in 2007 to
531 EJ in 2050. This is an increase of 95%. The
reference scenario provides the benchmark against
which the Energy [R]evolution scenarios are measured.
Energy demand reductions are principally limited
by the technical energy efficiency potentials, derived
from a detailed analysis of individual efficiency
potentials of a high variety of important energy
consuming technologies. However, taking into ac-
count implementation constraints, e.g. costs and other
barriers, a more sustainable energy demand path was
projected than the reference scenario, but more
conservative than the technical energy efficiency
potential: In the basic Energy [R]evolution scenario,
worldwide energy demand is reduced to 340 EJ in
2050 and to 326 EJ in the advanced Energy [R]
evolution scenario. For transport, global energy
demand is projected to increase from 82 PJ in 2007
to 158 EJ in 2050 in the reference scenario. In the
basic Energy [R]evolution scenario, this energy
demand is reduced to 83 EJ in 2050 and to 69.5 EJ
in the advanced scenario. For the Energy [R]evolution
scenarios, the projected energy demand reductions are
vital to achieve a share of 68.9% renewable energy in
the transport sector, 86.3% in the industry and 94.3%
in buildings and agriculture sector. The overall global
renewable energy share by 2050 could be as high as
87.1% of final energy supply.
To achieve an economically attractive growth of
renewable energy sources, a balanced and timely
mobilisation of all technologies is of great impor-
tance. Such mobilisation depends on technical poten-
tials, actual costs, cost reduction potentials and
technical maturity. Climate-friendly infrastructure,
district heating systems, smart grids and super grids
for renewable power generation, as well as more
R&D into storage technologies for electricity, are all
vital if this scenario is to be turned into reality.
The successful implementation of smart grids is vital
for the advanced Energy [R]evolution from 2020
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Table 8 Necessary renewable industry development under three different scenarios
Energy parameter









2020 27,708 27,248 25,851 25,919
2030 33,265 34,307 30,133 30,901
2050 50,606 46,542 37,993 43,922
PV 2020 68 108 437 594 17% 37% 42% 5 26 36
PV 2030 120 281 1,481 1,953 11% 15% 14% 18 91 124
PV 2050 213 640 4,597 6,846 10% 13% 15% 40 141 211
CSP2020 26 38 321 689 17% 49% 62% 1 5 12
CSP2030 54 121 1,447 2,734 14% 18% 17% 2 24 45
CSP2050 95 254 5,917 9,012 9% 17% 14% 4 44 66
Wind
on + offshore 2020 887 1,009 2,168 2,849 12% 22% 26% 26 74 101
on + offshore 2030 1,260 1,536 4,539 5,872 5% 9% 8% 60 178 229
on + offshore 2050 1,736 2,516 8,474 10,841 6% 7% 7% 47 158 202
Geothermal
For power generation
2020 119 117 235 367 6% 14% 20% 1 2 4
2030 158 168 502 1,275 4% 9% 15% 2 7 18
2050 229 265 1,009 2,968 5% 8% 10% 2 7 21
Heat and power
2010 2
2020 6 6 65 66 13% 47% 47% 0 1 1
2030 9 9 192 251 5% 13% 16% 0 3 5
2050 17 19 719 1,263 9% 16% 20% 0 6 11
Bio energy
For power generation
2020 324 337 373 392 8% 9% 10% 3 4 4
2030 474 552 456 481 6% 2% 2% 10 8 8
2050 474 994 717 580 7% 5% 2% 6 5 4
Heat and power
2020 272 186 739 742 2% 19% 19% 1 13 13
2030 367 287 1,402 1,424 5% 7% 8% 6 26 27
2050 613 483 3,013 2,991 6% 9% 9% 4 26 25
Ocean
2020 6 3 53 119 15% 55% 70% 0 2 4
2030 12 11 128 420 13% 10% 15% 0 3 12
2050 28 25 678 1,943 10% 20% 19% 0 10 27
Hydro
2020 4,164 4,027 4,029 4,059 2% 2% 2% 20 20 21
2030 4,833 4,679 4,370 4,416 2% 1% 1% 135 126 127
2050 6,027 5,963 5,056 5,108 3% 2% 2% 78 66 67
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onwards because dynamic power generation from wind
and solar photovoltaic in combination with a network of
decentralised cogeneration power plants and centralised
offshore wind farms require a different infrastructure
and operation of the network, in comparison to the
current system. It is also important to highlight that in
the advanced Energy [R]evolution scenario the majority
of remaining coal power plants—which will be replaced
20 years before the end of their technical lifetime—are
in China and India. This means that in practice, all coal
power plants built between 2005 and 2020 will be
replaced by renewable energy sources from 2040
onwards. To support the building of capacity in
developing countries, significant new public financing,
especially from industrialised countries, will be needed.
It is vital that specific funding mechanisms such as the
“Greenhouse Development Rights”8 and “Feed-in
tariff” schemes are developed under the international
climate negotiations that can assist the transfer of
financial support to climate change mitigation, includ-
ing technology transfer.
The authors of Energy [R]evolution scenarios
conclude that the required up scaling of the renewable
energy market is not the main barrier to achieve a
global renewable energy share greater than 80% or
even close to 100% by 2050.
However, the implementation of technical efficien-
cy standards to achieve the required energy efficiency
pathway as well as the restructuring of the required
infrastructure such as efficient smart grids and district
heating networks seem to be much bigger challenge.
Long-term energy policies with clear framework for
infrastructure investments are needed to move to-
wards a renewable energy system. The renewable
industry can only maintain double digit annual growth
rates for the coming years if the needed infrastructure
will be implemented by 2020. Besides the technical
challenges of grid integration from large shares of
wind and solar photovoltaic generation, a different
business model is required to build and operate
decentralised energy generation systems instead of
centralised power plants with maintenance workers
dispersed over an entire region rather than only on
power plant side. Demand side management becomes
an important factor to avoid large storage capacities
and to use fluctuating wind and solar PV power
generation as efficient as possible.
Specific policy designs for implementation
In order to implement a more efficient and largely
decentralised energy supply, all policies both for the
supply as well as for the demand sector must ensure
consistency. Being efficient must involved financial
benefits and long-term security is needed to change
and/or expand the infrastructure. Efficiency standards
for buildings for example reduce the overall heat
demand and could conflict with the expansion of
district heating networks. The implantation of smart
and super grids requires an integrated long-term
energy plan as well as specific technical standards.
The authors favour ever improving efficiency stand-
ards such as the Japanese “Top-Runner” model over
static models.
Successful support mechanisms such as the German
“Renewable Energy Act” provide security for invest-
ments for the supply side. A guaranteed and priority
access to the grid is essential for renewable energy
projects, especially large scale such as offshore wind.
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8 Greenhouse Development Rights: The Greenhouse Develop-
ment Rights (GDR) framework has been developed from
EcoEquity, School of Public Policy and the Georgia Institute
of Technology, Atlanta, USA, and calculates national shares of
global greenhouse gas obligations based on a combination of
responsibility (contribution to climate change) and capacity
(ability to pay). Crucially, GDRs take inequality within
countries into account and calculate national obligations on
the basis of the estimated capacity and responsibility of
individuals. Individuals with incomes below a “development
threshold”—specified in the default case as $7,500 per capita
annual income, PPP adjusted—are exempted from climate-
related obligations. Individuals with incomes above that level
are expected to contribute to the costs of global climate policy
in proportion to their capacity (amount of income over the
threshold) and responsibility (cumulative CO2 emissions since
1990, excluding emissions corresponding to consumption
below the threshold).
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Appendix
Table 9 Global final energy demand in PJ/a
PJ/a 2007 2015 2020 2030 2040 2050
Total (including non-energy use) 337,329 364,357 374,301 381,812 377,670 368,650
Total energy use 305,093 329,380 338,056 343,263 337,271 326,476
Transport 82,068 87,277 88,691 86,355 78,012 69,467
Oil products 76,535 78,901 76,682 62,767 41,671 18,448
Natural gas 3,131 3,327 3,253 2,878 2,130 1,424
Biofuels 1,429 3,258 4,832 8,062 9,000 9,723
Electricity 973 1,772 3,574 11,888 23,420 36,354
RES electricity 171 401 1,321 7,692 19,531 34,613
Hydrogen 0 18 349 760 1,791 3,517
RES share Transport 1,9% 4,2% 7,3% 19,1% 38,9% 68,9%
Industry 99,249 112,145 115,603 118,509 118,870 115,865
Electricity 24,995 31,759 33,787 36,531 38,720 39,770
RES electricity 4,627 7,622 12,038 20,944 30,606 37,202
District heat 9,424 10,605 12,347 15,249 19,596 23,718
RES district heat 560 2,213 4,542 8,800 15,123 21,468
Coal 19,546 21,902 20,114 16,417 6,334 515
Oil products 13,517 12,407 9,889 6,084 2,802 815
Gas 23,872 25,277 25,926 24,663 18,398 6,025
Solar 5 741 2,182 5,518 12,048 17,457
Biomass and waste 7,878 8,991 10,042 11,197 12,252 12,564
Geothermal 12 462 1,315 2,850 7,743 11,330
- Hydrogen 0 0 0 0 976 3,670
RES share Industry 13,2% 17,9% 26,1% 41,6% 65,4% 86,3%
Other Sectors 123,776 129,959 133,763 138,399 140,389 141,145
Electricity 33,253 37,880 39,973 44,424 48,406 52,551
RES electricity 5,842 9,618 16,114 27,991 39,913 50,000
District heat 6,546 7,968 9,770 12,740 16,136 18,145
RES district heat 439 1,701 3,610 7,160 12,504 16,629
Coal 4,535 4,007 3,146 2,658 978 23
Oil products 19,059 17,886 15,015 8,687 4,329 1,090
Gas 25,970 24,768 24,429 19,529 11,441 2,865
Solar 378 1,380 3,834 11,373 18,762 26,992
Biomass and waste 33,884 35,345 36,084 35,758 33,587 28,815
Geothermal 152 725 1,513 3,230 6,750 10,665
RES share other Sectors 32,9% 37,5% 45,7% 61,8% 79,4% 94,3%
Total RES 55,376 72,462 97,605 151,116 220,158 284,295
RES share 18,2% 22,0% 28,9% 44,0% 65,3% 87,1%
Non-energy use 32,236 34,977 36,245 38,549 40,398 42,174
Oil 24,832 26,267 27,026 28,444 29,627 30,761
Gas 6,084 6,901 7,289 7,951 8,400 8,817
Coal 1,320 1,808 1,930 2,154 2,371 2,595
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PJ/a Primary energy
2007 2015 2020 2030 2040 2050
OECD 230,864 216,760 202,070 180,841 157,571 138,280
North America 115,751 108,607 101,969 90,853 81,332 70,227
Europe 77,525 72,095 66,504 59,077 50,784 46,754
Pacific 37,588 36,059 33,596 30,911 25,455 21,299
Non-OECD 259,335 302,512 314,672 319,802 321,902 327,715
World 490,199 519,272 516,742 500,642 479,473 465,995





2007–2015 2015–2030 2030–2040 2040–2050 2007–2050
World 3.30% 3.00% 2.70% 2.44% .2.86%
OECD Europe 1.00% 1.80% 1.30% 1.10% 1.37%
OECD North America 1.80% 2.27% 1.55% 1.45% 1.77%
OECD Pacific 1.10% 1.23% 1.33% 1.40% 1.27%
Transition economies 4.60% 3.77% 2.60% 2.54% 3.38%
India 7.00% 5.90% 3.20% 2.50% 4.65%
China 8.80% 4.40% 3.20% 2.55% 4.74%
Other developing Asia 7.20% 4.60% 2.50% 2.20% 4.13%
Latin America 3.10% 2.50% 2.60% 2.40% 2.65%
Africa 4.70% 3.10% 3.40% 3.40% 3.65%
Middle East 4.50% 4.00% 2.30% 2.00% 3.20%
Table 11 GDP develop-
ment in all three
scenarios
Fig. 4 Global: development of electricity generation structure under three scenarios (Reference, Energy [R]evolution and advanced
Energy [R]evolution) [“Efficiency” reduction compared to the reference scenario]
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In GW 2007 2020 2030 2040 2050
Hydro E[R] Advanced E[R] 922 1,206 1,307 1,387 1,438
922 1,212 1,316 1,406 1,451
Biomass E[R] Advanced E[R] 46 212 336 500 625
46 214 343 501 621
Wind E[R] Advanced E[R] 95 878 1,733 2,409 2,943
95 1,140 2,241 3,054 3,754
Geothermal E[R] Advanced E[R] 11 49 108 196 279
11 69 238 469 693
PV E[R] Advanced E[R] 6 335 1.036 1,915 2,968
6 439 1.330 2,959 4,318
CSP E[R] Advanced E[R] 0 105 324 647 1,002
0 225 605 1,173 1,643
Ocean energy E[R] Advanced E[R] 0 29 73 168 303
0 58 180 425 748
Total E[R] Advanced E[R] 1,080 2,813 4,917 7,224 9,585
1,080 3,359 6,252 9,987 13,229
Table 12 Global: projec-




Fig. 5 Value chain in the power market today and under the Energy [r]evolution model (red utilities, light green mining companies,
blue renewable industry, dark green project developer)
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